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Immanuel Kant proposed a deontological, universalist theory of morality: The Categorical 
Imperative (CI). For Kant, the CI or moral law, is understood to be the ground of right action. 
It has several formulations each of which are provided in Kant’s seminal work, Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals.1 Its basic formulation is simple: ‘Always act in such a way that 
you can will that the maxim behind your action can be willed as a universal law’.2 However, 
the significance of Kantian moral philosophy for the sake of this thesis, lies in the vehement 
rejection of the necessity of compassion.3 So, unlike for example Christian morality and its 
emphasis on love and compassion in the face of the ‘other’, Kant posits instead an abstract 
morality that is purely a priori, dependant only on reason and acted upon from a metaphysical 
appeal to duty.4 Compassion is, according to Kant, ‘mere inclination’ and therefore not only 
morally inferior to actions motivated by duty, but moreover can negatively interfere with 
rational acts of reason.56 In Section I of the Groundwork Kant writes: ‘action first has its 
genuine moral worth’ only when it is done ‘without any inclination, simply from duty’,7 also 
that ‘an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination.’8   
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to question the validity of a moral philosophy that rejects 
the value of compassion. Arthur Schopenhauer addresses this question in the essay that sets out 
                                                          
1Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002). This will further be referred to as the Groundwork. As no other Kantian texts are 
considered in this thesis, footnotes will simply be referenced as ‘Kant’. 
2 Kant, p.37 
3 Laurence M. Hinman, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2013) 
p.164 
4 Kant, p.15 
5 Kant, p.43 
6 Compassion is not singled out by Kant, it is considered amongst other inclinations and empirical stimuli. My 
purpose for highlighting compassion specifically in this thesis is that Schopenhauer argues that this is the 
primary failing of Kant’s metaphysics of morals. 
7 Kant, p.14 
8 Kant, p.16 
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his own moral philosophy, On The Basis of Morality (OBM).9 Its premise is simple, one cannot 
appeal to the noumenal if one has done away with God.10 Instead, ethics must be based on 
observation. Schopenhauer writes:  
‘The concept of ought, the imperative form of ethics, applies solely to theological 
morality, and that outside this it loses all sense and meaning. I assume on the other hand 
that the purpose of ethics is to indicate, explain and trace to its ultimate ground the 
extremely varied behaviour of men from a moral point of view.’11   
Schopenhauer is therefore scathing of Kant’s formulation of moral philosophy.12 For him, 
Kant’s CI is a ‘particularist philosophy’, void of substance and unable to ‘support anything’, 
no less the basis of a moral philosophy.13 In stark contrast to Kant’s dismissal of compassion 
as mere inclination, Schopenhauer advocates evangelically on behalf of compassion that it is 
not only superior to Kantian notions of duty, but that compassion is the metaphysical basis of 
all moral action; he writes, ‘…only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it 
have moral value; and every action resulting from any other motive has none’.14  The polarity 
in thought between Kant and Schopenhauer makes for a valuable discussion of the place of 
compassion in our understanding of what constitutes genuine moral action. This polarity will 
form the main body of discussion in this dissertation. 
This dissertation will also seek to explore the role of compassion, and the contention between 
Kant’s noumenal and Schopenhauer’s phenomenological accounts of morality normatively, 
using the example of the Holocaust. It is my own view, concurrent with what Schopenhauer 
                                                          
9 Arthur Schopenhauer, On The Basis of Morality (Hackett Publishing, 1998). As no other texts from 
Schopenhauer are considered in this thesis, footnotes will simply be referenced as Schopenhauer. 
10 Schopenhauer, p.34 
11 Schopenhauer, p.130 
12 David E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.34 
13 Schopenhauer, p.64 
14 Schopenhauer, p.144 
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himself had feared, that basing morality on abstract and noumenal appeals to duty, fails in 
complex phenomenological human scenarios. Whilst Schopenhauer himself couldn’t have 
known the human atrocities that would darken the 20th century, his foresight regarding the 
failure of basing morality in the noumenal was realised. This is because, and I will expand upon 
in chapter one, the truth that Kantian moral theory was used as a tool of justification by the 
Nazis in their persecution of Jews during the Second World War.15  
 
Therefore, my thesis will take the following form: In the first chapter, I will outline Kant’s CI, 
its foundation in reason and duty, and its rejection of compassion as ‘mere inclination’.16 In 
order to recognise what most consider the successful universality of Kant’s moral philosophy, 
I will use the example given by Lawrence M. Hinman on cheating as an extension of Kant’s 
CI never to lie.17 However to highlight the flaws as I see them in Kant’s noumenal approach to 
moral philosophy, I will draw on the example of Hannah Arendt and her discussion of Nazi 
war criminal Adolf Eichmann.18 This will serve to elucidate upon and substantiate the point 
made by Schopenhauer, that Kant’s philosophy, in appealing to the noumenal, provides no 
moral foundation for phenomenal and empirical experience.19 In chapter two, I will provide 
Schopenhauer’s counter argument, his own moral philosophy in which compassion forms the 
very basis. In stark contrast to Kant, Schopenhauer is an observer of ethics, remarking on what 
some argue is psychological behaviour and others phenomenological experience.20 Regardless 
of this distinction, what become clear is that Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is both empirical 
                                                          
15 Joshua Halberstam, From Kant to Auschwitz (Social Theory and Practice Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 1988) pp. 41-
54 
16 Kant, p.43 
17 Hinman, p.168 (See also: Kant, p.4) 
18 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (London: Penguin, 1992) (See also: Carsten Bagge Laustsen and 
Rasmus Ugilt, Eichmann's Kant (The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 3, 2007) pp. 166–180) 
19 Schopenhauer, p.64 
20 Lawrence Blum, Compassion. In: Richard Rorty (ed) Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1980) pp. 507–517. Also, Brendan Terrence Leier, Schopenhauer Redux: A Contemporary Rereading of 
Schopenhauer's Theory of Compassion (University of Alberta, 2002) 
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and a posteriori.21 Schopenhauer argues that to understand what constitutes morality one must 
observe human behaviour and ask what motivates us to do good.22 This, simply put, is 
compassion. That said, there are issues with Schopenhauer's reasoning that some regard 
fundamental, these relate to his positioning of compassion in metaphysics.23 However, in 
chapter three I will seek to address those criticisms and in returning to the Holocaust to 
evidence this defence, argue that the case of Le Chambon, infamous for their rescue of Jewish 
refugees during the Holocaust, appealed to a metaphysical, Schopenhauerian morality of 
compassion in their endeavour. Not only will this chapter seek to champion Schopenhauerian 
compassion, but it will also refute Kant’s CI never to lie.24 The Holocaust example will 
ultimately serve to highlight the importance of moral integration, that is, appeals to both reason 
and compassion in ethical dilemmas. This will be both the most theoretical and least 
academically supported area of my thesis, however I aim to demonstrate that it serves as 
resolution to the criticisms levied at Schopenhauer's metaphysics, and as such demands an 







                                                          
21 Schopenhauer, p.xvii 
22 Schopenhauer, p.75 
23 Leier, p.96-104 
24 Kant, p.4 
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KANTS MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF DUTY 
 
Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals has come to be considered a 
central work in the subject of ethics. It is the site on which Kant sets out to build a ‘supreme 
principle of morality’25 from an a priori foundation of ‘pure practical reason’.26 Kant’s moral 
philosophy is then purely rationalist in its foundation. Any empirical elements in ethics are for 
him, theoretical impurities.27 So too is any notion of consequentialism based on the experience 
of pleasure or inclination.28. Key to his moral philosophy is universality; what is fair to me is 
fair to someone else.29 According to Kant, for an action to have moral worth, the action must 
be motivated solely by duty through the engagement of reason and reason alone.30 The success, 
it is argued, of the Kantian CI, is its universality; a moral philosophy that is equally applicable 
to all. The CI is therefore, in this basic intuitive sense, very simple; it is categorical in that it is 
unconditional and imperative in that it tells us what to do.31 Kant writes: 
‘there is one imperative that, without being grounded on any other aim to be achieved 
through a certain course of conduct as its condition, commands this conduct 
immediately. This imperative is categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action 
and what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which it results; 
and what is essentially good about it consists in the disposition, whatever the result may 
be. This imperative may be called that of morality.32 
                                                          
25 Kant, p.8 
26 Kant, p.7 (See also: Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics (The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 19, No. 5, September 1910) p.514) 
27 Kant, p.20 
28 Kant, p.16 (See also: Dale Jacquette, Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Acumen, 2005) p.205) 
29 Hinman, p.166 
30 Kant, p.4 (See also: p.33) 
31 Kant, p.30 
32 Kant, p.33 
9 
 
Kant further formulates the CI in the following way: 
‘Always act in such a way that you can will that the maxim behind your action can be 
willed as a universal law.’33 
What is central is that for Kant, morality cannot be based on empirical factors; these he argues 
are contingent and as such can’t form the basis for any universalizable concepts.34 Compassion 
for Kant is empirical, subject to change based on our own ‘inclination’.35 Compassion is 
therefore not essential to moral action, quite the opposite. Kant views compassion as a threat 
to our commitment to reason, a threat that can overwhelm and distort our vision of what is right 
and good.36 Compassion he argues, exists in the phenomenal, is behavioural and thus 
contingent.37 Duty he writes, and ‘the moral law in general…by way of reason alone…[has] an 
influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives.’38 This is 
therefore the supreme principle of moral action which Kant calls ‘pure practical reason’ and 
this forms the foundation of his metaphysics.39 For Kant, moral agents are composed entirely 
of reason and will, and accordingly, a ‘good will’ is derived of reason and acted on from duty 
alone. Kant writes: 
‘The good will is good not through what it effects or accomplishes, not through its 
efficacy for attaining any intended end, but only through its willing, i.e., good in itself, 
and considered for itself, without comparison, it is to be estimated far higher than 
anything that could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, or indeed, if you 
prefer, of the sum of all inclinations.’40  
                                                          
33 Kant, p.37 
34 Kant, p.24 
35 Kant, p.43 
36 Kant, p.74 
37 Kant, p.103 
38 Kant, p.27 
39 Kant, p.7 (See also: p.28-29) 
40 Kant, p.10 
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This way of viewing what is morally good, entirely negates ones need to consider morality 
consequentially. Doing what is right, merely because it is right, not because such an action will 
yield the best consequences is the key to what constitutes morally right action. This is arguably 
aimed at and many argue, achieves consistency and impartiality. Kant’s example of lying is 
frequently cited to demonstrate the success of this consistency and universality.41 When 
combined with the CI, Kant creates the maxim that lying is morally wrong because ultimately 
‘I can will the lie but not at all a universal law to lie’.42 Laurence M. Hinman in Ethics: A 
Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, discusses this in relation to cheating: ‘I say to myself 
that cheating on an exam is bad, but just this time it is okay for me to cheat…’43 His example 
illustrates a subjective form of moral scrutiny. However, in Kant’s CI, Hinman suggests is the 
overcoming of any arbitrary exceptions we make for ourselves or indeed others, by offering a 
moral philosophy focused entirely on intention.44 If, according to the CI, I deem it acceptable 
for myself to cheat on an exam, I therefore deem all cheating on exams equally acceptable. As 
I would not deem all cheating on exams acceptable it is therefore immoral for me to cheat 
myself. The test then for Kant’s ‘maxim’ is, as articulated by Hinman, dependant on ‘whether 
people could consistently will that everyone adopt this maxim as a guide to their actions’.45  
Hinman, like many scholars scrutinising the viability of Kant’s moral philosophy, has drawn 
from Kant’s example of lying to evidence the success of his deontological approach. However, 
interestingly Kant is explicit in the opening lines of the Groundwork that its purpose is not to 
demonstrate ‘in practice’ the application of the CI or conversely highlight instances of its 
misapplication.46 Nevertheless, there are instances throughout the Groundwork where Kant 
                                                          
41 Kant, p.131 
42 Kant, p.19 
43 Hinman, p.168 
44 Hinman, p.167 
45 Hinman, p.167 
46 Kant, p.6-8 
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does exactly this. It is arguably in these instances that one finds Kant’s insistence that 
compassion (along with other ‘inclinations’) should be remit from moral action. The first is 
what has come to be known as ‘The Moral Misanthrope’ and is arguably Kant’s most blatant 
assault on compassion.47 He writes: 
‘there are some souls so sympathetically attuned that, even without any other motive of 
vanity or utility to self, take an inner gratification in spreading joy around them, and 
can take delight in the contentment of others insofar as it is their own work. But I assert 
that in such a case the action, however it may conform to duty and however amiable it 
is, nevertheless has no true moral worth, but is on the same footing as other 
inclinations…Thus suppose the mind of that same friend of humanity were clouded 
over with his own grief, extinguishing all his sympathetic participation in the fate of 
others; he still has the resources to be beneficent to those suffering distress, but the 
distress of others does not touch him because he is sufficiently busy with his own; and 
now, where no inclination any longer stimulates him to it, he tears himself out of this 
deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination, solely from duty; only 
then does it for the first time have its authentic moral worth. Even more: if nature had 
put little sympathy at all in the heart of this or that person, if he (an honest man, to be 
sure) were by temperament cold and indifferent toward the sufferings of others, perhaps 
because he himself is provided with particular gifts of patience and strength to endure 
his own, and also presupposes or even demands the same of others; if nature has not 
really formed such a man into a friend of humanity (although he would not in truth be 
its worst product), nevertheless would he not find a source within himself to give 
himself a far higher worth than that which a good-natured temperament might have? 
By all means! Just here begins the worth of character, which is moral and the highest 
                                                          
47 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's the right thing to do? (Macmillan, 2010) p.114 
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without any comparison, namely that he is beneficent not from inclination but from 
duty.’48 
Academics have long since scrutinised this passage exactly for the reason this thesis explores 
– can Kant really be rejecting the role of compassion in morality? And if so, are these examples 
sufficient to support that rejection? To begin in addressing this question, one must understand 
what it is that Kant is suggesting is wrong with compassion, and how he is evidencing it through 
‘The Moral Misanthrope’. Michael Sandel argues the success of Kant’s example lay in 
highlighting the contingent nature of compassion caused by consideration of utility. Sandel’s 
interpretation hinges on the ‘moral misanthrope’ taking no ‘pleasure’ in helping his fellow 
man. For when the individual lacks any inclination to help his fellow man in his suffering, he 
does so ‘for the sake of duty alone’. This Sandel argues, is fundamental to what matters most 
to Kant. Good deeds he suggests ‘should be done because it’s the right thing to do—whether 
or not doing it gives us pleasure’.49 Sandel argues that Kant is being dismissive of compassion 
from a consequentialist perspective – the pleasure one would gain from acts originating from 
emotional inclination. As surprising as it may be given the deontological basis of his 
philosophy, Kant is known to describe moral feelings like those understood by Sandel as 
consequences of utility: ‘the receptivity to pleasure or displeasure merely from the 
consciousness of the correspondence or conflict of our action with the law of duty’.50 Paul 
Guyer is a leading scholar on Kantian moral philosophy and analysing this work, suggests that 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure are, according to Kant ‘the linchpin between possible and 
actual action’.51 When these feelings of utility precede the act of duty (moral law), they are 
                                                          
48 Kant, p.14-15 
49 Sandel, p.114-115 
50 Kant, p.45 




pathological. Whereas if the feelings and subsequent pleasure or displeasure succeed the act of 
duty (moral law), ‘then the feeling is moral’.52 Guyer deduces: 
‘Kant’s assumption is that we typically consider whether to perform an action in 
conformity with duty in the face of the possibility of an alternative action suggested by 
self-love, and thus, that assuming we are moved by the thought of the moral law, then 
we typically experience both displeasure at the thought of one action contrary to duty 
that is open to us and pleasure at the thought of the alternative action open to us that 
would correspond to duty. If we interpret this to mean that we feel displeasure at the 
thought of forgoing an action contrary to duty but (even greater) pleasure at the thought 
of performing an action in conformity with duty, then [this is] moral feeling as Kant 
describes it…’53 
Guyer contends that Kant’s philanthropist example ‘is not on [Kant’s] own view a realistic 
account of moral motivation, but a thought experiment intended only to elucidate the content 
of the moral law’.54 Nevertheless, this elucidation is scathing of compassion and the argument 
from utility is arguably insufficient to justify what Kant calls the ‘dangers’ of compassionate 
inclination.55  
In a very different analysis of the same example, Stephen Sverdlik argues that ‘The Moral 
Misanthrope’ is ultimately illustrative of Kant’s criticism of any reliance on human nature and 
innate inclinations of compassion - as these are empirical and subjective and therefore variable 
to the extreme.56 Sverdlik suggests that Kant questions the value of emotional inclination and 
compassion, from the position of it being absent.57 How do individuals function morally if they 
                                                          
52 Guyer, p.140 
53 Guyer, p.141 
54 Guyer, p.148 
55 Kant, p.28 (See also: p.13-16) 
56 Steven Sverdlik, Compassion and Sympathy as Moral Motivation (Occasional Papers, Vol 3, 2008) p.2-3 
57 Sverdlik, p.12-14 
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are naturally devoid of compassion, or if a compassionate impulse fails to be triggered? 
Accordingly, he says Kant argues that compassion therefore fails as a criterion for moral 
actions and suggests that in the absence of natural impulses, one retains reason and reason 
alone can compel us to moral acts.58 Nevertheless, Sverdlik fails to be convinced by this 
engaging with reason and reason alone. Kant’s reliance on ‘duty’ he argues, needn’t be at the 
exclusion of other inclination.59 
Similar concerns are raised by Hinman, who suggests that this lack of integration shows that 
Kant’s moral philosophy ‘misses the mark’. 60Hinman offers two reasons why Kant’s disregard 
for compassion can have ‘undesirable consequences’: firstly, it renders moral life ‘myopic’, 
and secondly, but centrally, emotional responses are necessary and have a place in moral life, 
for even when one is unable to act, one can still feel an emotional response to the other.61 
Compassion, Hinman argues, is therefore a requisite of truly understanding suffering and is 
thus essential to morality.62  
Key to Hinman’s discussion of Kant is then, moral integration. The myopia that he speaks of 
relates centrally to the deontological nature of the CI. He seemingly asks whether moral 
philosophy can ever be non-consequentialist. In order to comprehend right-action one must 
relate to the proverbial other. Hinman suggests that whilst Kant rightly dismissed consequence 
as motivation for morality as a matter of chance, in this vein he went too far.63 Kant provided, 
in the CI, a way of assessing the moral worth of an individual’s intention. However, in so doing, 
made intention, and as we have seen intention as a metaphysical appeal to an a priori notion 
of ‘duty’, all that was required to give worth to moral action. This is the point which Hinman 
                                                          
58 Sverdlik, p.12 
59 Sverdlik, p.17 
60 Hinman, p.179 
61 Hinman, p.179-180 
62 Hinman, p.180 
63 Hinman, p.179-180 
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and Sverdlik analysis of Kant’s moral philosophy agree, here they argue Kant ‘misses the mark’ 
by failing to integrate human inclination and emotional response. They argue, as do I, that 
compassion as inclination is a human tool that helps us perceive the world.64  
Stephen Sverdlik demonstrated the possible success of Kant’s ‘Moral Misanthrope’ example, 
resided in the absent.65 Compassion is subjective and contingent Kant argued, it is ‘mere 
emotional inclination’ and his hypothetical scenario demonstrated the role of reason and duty 
in providing consistency. However, Sverdlik concluded that the same criticism of emotional 
inclination can too be said for responses that are formed merely of duty; acts from duty alone 
can also lead to wrongdoing.66 Arguably the greatest example of this takes physical form in the 
example of war criminal Adolf Eichmann.67 The essay Eichmann's Kant, though highly 
defensive of Kantian theory, demonstrates that removal of emotional inclination and 
compassion, and appeal to duty alone, produces a actualisation of the CI that in this particular 
case, became the justification for evil.68 
The trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was covered by Hannah Arendt, a political 
philosopher and herself a German Jewish refugee. The notable significance for this discussion 
is that Eichmann appealed explicitly to Kant’s notion of duty in defence of his crimes.69 In her 
transcripts of the trial Arendt noted Eichmann as stating:  
“I had known the Categorical Imperative… ‘Be loyal to the laws, be a disciplined 
person, live an orderly life, do not come into conflict with the laws.’” and furthermore, 
                                                          
64 Hinman, p.164-165 
65 Sverdlik, p.12-13 
66 Sverdlik, p.16 
67 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.166–180 
68 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.167 
69 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.166 
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“I meant by my remark about Kant that the principle of my will must always be such 
that it can become the principle of universal laws”.70  
Clearly then, a correct articulation of Kant’s theory of duty. However, Arendt argues his 
perception of the CI is utterly distorted,71 and writes what it is she believes he is really alluding 
to:  
‘Act as if the principle of your actions were the same as the legislator or of the law of 
the land’ or better still, ‘Act in such a way that the führer, if he knew your action, would 
approve of it.’72  
Arendt argues that Eichmann, along with other murderers ‘knew full well that murder is against 
the normal desires and inclinations of most people’.73 This provides a fascinating critique, for 
Arendt is positing inclination as the key to Eichmann’s misunderstanding. However, 
inclination is exactly the thing that Kant argues is irrelevant to morality. Her appeal to 
inclination is strange particularly given that her position on compassion moreover is consistent 
with Kant, that it is insufficient in moral scenarios.74 However Arendt is immovable in 
condemning Eichmann’s defence (using Kant’s moral philosophy) and is forced to conclude 
that Eichmann’s evil is banal. Banal evil she argues is a ‘surface phenomena’ created by lack 
of thinking and will to act politically.75 Arendt’s conclusion is fascinating for this discussion, 
for it highlights the issue of consistency that Kant so strongly appeals to. His argument against 
compassion as inclination is because in his opinion reason is more consistent and is that which 
we can all appeal. However, there is a clear negation of emotional inclination found in 
Eichmann’s justification of evil, however, there is also according to Arendt, a lack of thinking. 
                                                          
70 Arendt, p.136 
71 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.166 
72 Arendt, p.136 
73 Arendt, p.150 
74 Patricia Roberts-Miller, "The tragic limits of compassionate politics" (JAC, 2007) p.696 
75 Arendt, p.251 
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So did Eichmann’s evil both transcended compassion and reason? I would argue not. Eichmann 
reasoned in order to justify his actions. His reasoning allowed for killing in the name of duty, 
what was absent was compassion for those he murdered, a compassion that he too can justify 
in his appeal to Kantian deontology.  
The conclusions I have drawn in this analysis are by no means popular. Patricia Roberts-Miller 
strongly defends Arendt’s position, that Eichmann has grossly misunderstood Kant. Following 
Arendt’s lead, she argues that Eichmann indeed felt compassion for his victims (though how 
this can be speculated on, one remains unsure), and was moved by seeing concentration camps, 
thus feeling compassion was a capacity he possessed. Nevertheless, Eichmann was, according 
to Arendt and Roberts-Miller, not moved to action by his compassion, simply because 
compassion ‘doesn’t lead to action’.76 Furthermore, ‘the solution to the Nazi genocide was not 
to try to get Nazis to feel more compassion’.77 My aim in contrasting Kant with Schopenhauer 
in this dissertation is to highlight these misinterpretations of what compassion is, and how it 
functions in morality. The understanding of compassion espoused by both Arendt and Roberts-
Miller supposes a Kantian ‘inclination’ that may certainly be relative and unreliable, however 
Schopenhauerian compassion, as we will see, involves ‘participation’ in the suffering of the 
‘other’ that in itself is so much more that observational. 
The aim of this discussion is not however to argue that Kant’s moral philosophy and 
specifically the CI leads to abhorrent behaviours, merely that in the mistrust of emotional 
inclination, the CI replaces fellow feeling (empathy and compassion) with dutiful reasoning 
that can be appealed to, to justify abhorrent behaviour. In Eichmann, the CI is seemingly used 
as a retrospective tool of justification that, whilst Arendt defends as misunderstood, is 
                                                          
76 Roberts-Miller, p.696 
77 Roberts-Miller, p.698 
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interpreted nonetheless correctly as placing aside emotional inclination in favour of duty.78 
Following Arendt’s deduction, I return to Laustsen and Ugilt who write at length in the essay 
Eichmann’s Kant, regarding Eichmann’s use of the Kantian CI to defend his crimes.79 Their 
key premise is to argue that Eichmann uses Kant’s CI as a ‘dehumanizing tool’.80 This they say 
is significant primarily because he does not want to acknowledge the choices he had in his 
crimes. Eichmann acted dutifully, they suggest but Kant’s demand in the CI is to act out of 
duty. This small difference they argue, but in agreement with Arendt, is fundamental;81 
Eichmann didn’t act ‘out of duty and only out of duty’ but dutifully for the Fatherland and Nazi 
ideology moreover.82 His use of Kant as justification for evil, despite as some argue, distorted, 
provides a ‘story of how the moral law is all too easily actualized’, even if incorrectly, in the 
phenomenal world.83 Therefore, unlike Arendt they contend the CI cannot be ‘ultimate 
guarantee of morality’.84 It would be fair to reason that their understanding of the relationship 
between Kant’s noumenal moral philosophy and observed behavioural phenomena does raise 
significant questions regarding moral integration. Can reason or compassion be sufficient to 





                                                          
78 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.166 
79 Laustsen and Ugilt, p. 166–180 
80 Lausten and Ugilt, p. 176 
81 Lausten and Ugilt, p. 176 
82 Laustsen and Ugilt, p. 177 
83 Laustsen and Ugilt, p.167 




SCHOPENHAUER CONTRA KANT  
SCHOPENHAUER'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF COMPASSION 
We needn’t only look to modern academic analysis to find objections to Kant’s philosophy of 
morals, for it was almost instantaneous in the response given by Arthur Schopenhauer.85  
‘I therefore confess the particular pleasure with which I set to work to remove the broad 
cushion from ethics, and frankly express my intention of proving Kant’s practical 
reason and categorical imperative are wholly unjustified, groundless, and fictitious 
assumptions, and of showing that even Kant’s ethics lacks a solid foundation.’86 
Schopenhauer was then particularly scathing of Kant’s philosophy of morals, continuing: 
‘like a web of the subtlest conceptions devoid of all contents: it is based on nothing and 
can therefore support nothing and move nothing.’87 
From these comments alone one can deduce the twofold criticism Schopenhauer aims at Kant. 
The first is the problem of the noumenal, a priori foundation upon which Kant seeks to build 
his moral philosophy and the second is quite simply of motivation for moral action. Radoslav 
A. Tsanoff, in his essay Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Theory of Ethics, addresses the 
first of these. In summarising Schopenhauer's position he writes; 
‘For no theory of morals can have any real significance if its basis is alien to concrete 
experience. A morality for which the joys and sorrows of mortal men and women have 
no real, essential meaning, is itself barren of any meaning for mortal men and women. 
Morality is no abstractly rational concern of phantom citizens in some noumenal 
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Kingdom of Ends; it cannot borrow its sanction of authority from any transcendent 
Deity or any divinely inscribed Decalogue. An ethics of abstract sorites may do for a 
universe of bloodless artifacts; but an ethics which would show living man the springs 
of his own conduct, and set before him the concrete vision of his own dimly felt ideals, 
such an ethics must necessarily find both its problem and its method in human 
experience. This is the proper sphere of the moral philosopher; here and here alone is 
the real basis of morality to be sought.’88 
This is then, the first mistake Schopenhauer identifies, that is in the very construction of Kant’s 
morality, the a priori basis, which noumenal, rejects actual phenomenological experience. In 
the rejection of all empirical influence (compassion and other inclination) Kant’s ethical system 
is super sensuous and completely reliant on intelligibility and rationality which itself is 
contingent.89 To this end Schopenhauer argues that Kant’s Categorical Imperative is nothing 
but a hypothetical world of ‘ought’. The ‘ought’ he argues, in the absence of religious doctrine, 
carries no obligation at all. Any examples that Kant may offer, for instance the example of not 
lying, is, in the absence of religious obligation, merely a long-observed phenomena of human 
consequential experience – in that through trial and error we learn. As such, Schopenhauer 
writes: 
‘What ought to be done is therefore necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward: 
consequently, to use Kant’s language, it is essentially and inevitably hypothetical, and 
never, as he maintains, categorical.’90 
However, Schopenhauer does not seek to counter Kant with a merely consequentialist or 
utility-based philosophy of morality, but instead a moral philosophy of compassion. It is this 
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response that grips academics, who, like myself, argue that moral philosophy must be grounded 
on phenomenal human experience. Schopenhauer’s own theory is clear: 
‘I say, in contradiction to Kant, that the student of Ethics ... must content himself with 
explaining and interpreting that which is given, in other words, that which really is, or 
takes place.... Ethics has to do with actual human conduct, and not with the a priori 
building of card houses, a performance which yields results that no man would ever 
turn to in the stern stress and battle of life.’91 
He continues elsewhere in On the Basis of Morality: 
‘I set for ethics the purpose of interpreting, expounding, explaining, and reducing to 
their ultimate ground humans’ ways of acting, which from a moral view are extremely 
variable. Therefore there remains no other path to the discovery of the foundations of 
ethics than the empirical, specifically to investigate whether there are any actions at all 
to which we must grant genuine moral worth.’92 
What Schopenhauer then proposes, is a morality that is based on all ‘living humanity’ as 
opposed to simply ‘rational beings’.93 In order to understand what is moral he argues, one must 
orientate themselves in the a posteriori realm, and look to human behaviour and ask what is 
considered good? What is considered bad? And most importantly, where do these behaviours 
originate from? This for Schopenhauer involves both introspection and observation from which 
he suggests can be observed a threefold understanding of human behaviour. He suggests that 
there exists two anti-moral incentives - Egoism (Egoismus) and Malice (Bosheit), and an 
incentive that is positioned diametrically opposite: Compassion.; (Mitleid).94 
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According to Schopenhauer one always begins from the primary ‘antimoral incentive’ that is 
‘egoism’. Egoism is the place from which human conduct functions. Each of us is at the centre 
of his/her own world, pursuing their own selfish desires.95 Gerard Mannion, in his essay titled 
Mitleid, Metaphysics and Morality: Understanding Schopenhauer's Ethics, describes this as 
all being ‘subservient to the interests of the egoistic self’.96 He argues that Schopenhauer's 
intention is not to position egoism as the neutral position, much the opposite, it is the anti-
moral incentive, and as such carries great power. Indeed, because egoism promotes ones’ own 
needs above the needs of others, it can result in narcissism that Schopenhauer calls the 
‘principle of individuation’.97 However, it is the second principle of human action that 
Schopenhauer posits as the most dangerous, even more so than overt and narcissistic egoism. 
The second principle of human action is Malice (Bosheit), also referred to as spitefulness. 
Schopenhauer argues that this anti-moral incentive is the ‘principle opponent’ of justice.98 He 
writes: 
‘to spitefulness (Gehdssigkeit) might be ascribed disaffection, envy, ill-will, malice, 
pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity, slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, 
anger, treachery, fraud, thirst for revenge, cruelty, etc.’99 
Schopenhauer argues that in malice we seek to gain nothing for ourselves but may even cause 
ourselves harm in the pursuit of causing the suffering of another.  
This a posteriori perspective on incentives appears admittedly bleak. Schopenhauer’s 
empirical strategy of ‘first looking around a little at the lives of men’ has arguably produced a 
view of humanity which would substantiate Kant’s view that emotional inclination, good and 
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bad, is harmful.100 However, despite Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is nevertheless driven 
by the question of, 
‘whether actions of voluntary justice and disinterested loving-kindness, capable of 
rising to nobleness and magnanimity, occur in experience’.101 
And the answer for Schopenhauer - an emphatic yes. It is in this avocation of ‘voluntary justice 
and disinterested loving kindness’ that he believes can be found the basis of morality.102 
Alongside our tendencies toward egoism, there is he argues an intuition that forces us to 
recognise one another’s humanity.103 If egoism is the ‘anti-moral incentive’, there is conversely 
a ‘true moral incentive’ that ‘recognises in another’s individuality the same inner nature as in 
one’s own’.104 This everyday phenomena is compassion, and it is much greater and more 
significant that our comprehension and has greater influence than reason.105 Schopenhauer 
argues and it is compassion (Mitleid) therefore, that is fundamental to any understanding of 
metaphysical morality.106 Whilst this may seem somewhat oxymoronic, considering 
phenomena and metaphysics as one and the same, moral action for Schopenhauer can only 
occur where the separation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ disappears, a separation that exists in the 
form of compassion.107 He writes: 
‘The absence of all egoistic motivation is, therefore, the criterion of action of moral 
worth.’108 
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Ursula Wolf in her essay How Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion can contribute to today’s 
ethical debate summarises the relationship between will, negation of ego and compassion when 
she writes, 
‘In Schopenhauer’s view, the will or an action is always motivated by the “weal and 
woe”…(in) feeling compassion, we identify with others and take part in their suffering, 
we feel their “woe” as if it were our own and thus want their well-being as if it were 
our own.’109 
It is exactly this recognition of ‘weal and woe’ that constitutes Schopenhauer's second criticism 
of Kant. His argument is that Kant’s positioning of the moral law alongside pure reason outside 
of the realms of natural causality renders it vacuous and unexplainable. Instead he posits that 
whilst reason and will are necessary, they are subject to the law of causality and require 
sufficient motive for action.110 In the absence of such motive, Schopenhauer is forced to 
conclude that the CI must be egoistically motivated and is thus without moral value.111 
Schopenhauer therefore proposes that in order to understand morality, one must look to the 
empirical, enacted world, where humanity resides subject to causality.112 Only here he 
suggests, can one find the phenomena that motivates reason and in turn moral action, and that 
is compassion. This he argues, in direct opposition to Kant, is about substance and a posteriori 
experience, not the abstract a priori.113 Wolf, having analysed this argument refers to Kant’s 
moral theory as therefore ‘content-free’, a position she observes in Schopenhauer's criticism 
that she argues is ‘irrefutable’.114 
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Schopenhauer, working from this empirical premise, sought to elucidate upon a simple moral 
principle in much the same way as Kant had done in the now infamous CI. Schopenhauer's 
own principle of ethics being: 
‘Injure no one, on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can.’115 
This he argues is formed of the ‘cardinal’ virtues that flow from compassion: the virtue of 
justice and the virtue of loving-kindness.116 The virtue of justice constructs the first part of his 
principle, the negative, to ‘injure no one’. Schopenhauer argues that this justice comes about 
from compassions capacity to ‘call out…Stop!’ in a twofold way, it forces my identification 
with the other and provides a barrier between myself and the other that my ego would otherwise 
not comprehend.117 The virtue of loving-kindness conversely, is responsible for the positive 
component to ‘help everyone as much as you can’.118 This is also referred to by Schopenhauer 
as philanthropy which proposes an active expression of compassion.119 For Schopenhauer this 
philanthropy is most obviously seen in Christianity and other religious doctrines.120 However, 
given his enlightened eagerness to depart from the confines of religion, he posits compassion 
as observed in all, and available to all through a metaphysical departure from the otherwise 
selfish ego.121 
It is in this denial of ego and metaphysical appeal that we observe the most obvious similarities 
in Kant and Schopenhauer. They both proport a moral philosophy that is only possible through 
the denial of ego; though Schopenhauer argues that in fact Kant’s philosophy fails for exactly 
this point, he argues that the Categorical Imperative serves egoism. Both philosophers also 
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hinge their moral philosophies on the application of free will and consider each of us 
existentially free to determine our own course of right and wrong. And both regard the ability 
to discern this right and wrong through reason and rationality.122 However, the strength of the 
similarities in their moral philosophies is considerably outweighed in the formulation of their 
metaphysics, and it is here that one finds the argument that Kant’s moral theory holds stronger 
than that of Schopenhauer. 
The contention then appears to lay in the positioning of each philosophers’ moral philosophy. 
Kant’s deontology positioned in the noumenal, where morality is understood as a priori and 
enacted through duty to the categorical imperative. Whilst Schopenhauer's philosophy of 
compassion is based on a posteriori experience of human incentives: ego, malice and 
compassion. Vastly different then is conception, yet nevertheless, both claim to be 
metaphysical. Even stated in this simplistic way, it is easy to see why one finds positioning 
Schopenhauer's morality in the metaphysical realm confusing. To this end, Schopenhauer 
admits the positioning of his metaphysical theory almost reluctantly in his discussion of Italian 
philosopher Cassina.123 This reluctance is justified, given that the first half of OBM is 
ultimately criticising Kant’s metaphysics in form as much as theory. On the one hand 
Schopenhauer wants to argue for a morality based on observed behaviours and phenomena, yet 
he is emphatic that his is a metaphysical moral theory. The point of contention is that he posits 
compassion as the un-egoistic drive that is ‘inborn in human beings’124 yet also that ‘the single 
undivided thing in itself is the will, of which the many individuals are phenomenal, and 
ultimately illusionary manifestations’.125 Understandably then, even those who champion 
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Schopenhauerian ethics struggle with this point – the positioning of compassion as something 
both a-priori and a-posteriori. 
Much academic analysis of Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion is focused on its positioning 
in metaphysics and thus often critical.126 Lawrence Blum is among scholars who are both in 
admiration of Schopenhauer, but whom consider its demise in its metaphysical formulation.127 
However, I would suggest that it is the metaphysical positioning in Schopenhauer’s conception 
that serves to overcome criticism of the relative nature of compassion. This is because there is, 
justifiably, a wealth of argument that concerns compassion bias, a bias Schopenhauer must 
have been conscious of himself. One need only look to their own family relationship to know 
that we naturally extend more compassion to our nearest and dearest then to strangers. So how 
then, as we have argued so far, can an ethic of compassion be consistent? The answer lay 
conveniently in Schopenhauer's metaphysical understanding. His account extends the virtue of 
compassion beyond kinship, and beyond any other natural boundary.128 His metaphysics lay in 
an individuals transcendence of themselves to recognise in the other their own true ‘inner 
nature’.129 He writes: 
‘The good character, on the other hand, lives in an external world that is homogenous 
with his own true being. The others are not a non-ego for him, but an “I once more”.’130 
Schopenhauer's explanation of the metaphysical aspect of his ethic is minimal, and minimal by 
his own admission because he believes he has provided sufficient empirical evidence for the 
grounding of morality in compassion. That said, it is difficult to find any academic analysis 
that considers this move from phenomenological and psychological to metaphysical successful. 
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Blum for example argues that compassion is rightfully found in ‘imaginative dwelling’, seeing 
the other as myself I am compelled to compassionate action in the face of his suffering.131 
Imagination here is key he argues as compassion he posits, begins with a psychological 
identification with the others suffering. This can extend into behaviour, but itself has no 
metaphysical significance.132 His analysis is important because it is not only an appreciation of 
elements of Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion, but it is also a rejection that compassion is 
simply mere ‘inclination’ as suggested by Kant. In accord with Schopenhauer, Blum argues, 
our compassion often works ‘contrary’ to inclination exactly because it is much more complex 
than simple emotions.133 However, I believe, based on Schopenhauer's understanding of the 
ego (the leading incentive), he would consider Blum’s merely psychological account a weak 
understanding of compassion even if it considers compassion as greater than merely 
inclination. 
In Blum, criticism of Schopenhauer's metaphysics is replaced with psychological accounting 
for the role of compassion, but this feels almost callous to Schopenhauer's project, a project 
that arguably seeks to overcome any relative shortcomings that could be so readily levied at 
even a higher version of compassionate psychology.134 Leier, having considered both theories, 
himself argues for a remittance of the metaphysical in Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion, but 
seeks to replace it with phenomenology.135 Given the emphasis on the phenomenological in 
Schopenhauer's theory this seems much more sympathetic. His argument is that Schopenhauer 
uses the metaphysical to overcome relative psychological criticism but he draws on the works 
of Scheler and Heidegger to evidence how ‘unmediated, pre-cognitive’ identification with the 
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other is also possible in the phenomenal.136137 Another, all the more successful critique from 
Marshall, proposes a Levinasian138 appeal to the ‘other’ in our ‘sameness’.139 He argues that 
Schopenhauer ‘thinks that, in compassion, we immediately apprehend others’ pains in a way 
that conflicts with our normal views about the distinctness of individuals’140 He continues: 
‘The compassionate person, on Schopenhauer’s view, has a deep metaphysical insight 
that the egoist lacks…Schopenhauer claims that this insight is part of compassion itself, 
and so the basis of compassionate action. This sameness is a deep metaphysical fact, 
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A NORMATIVE EXPLORATION OF KANTS MORALITY OF DUTY AND 
SCHOPENHAUER'S MORALITY OF COMPASSION 
In what follows I want to overcome the discussion of metaphysical criticism in Schopenhauer's 
moral philosophy. This I will argue by following Schopenhauer's lead in looking specifically 
at ‘what is’ rather than ‘what ought’ to be.142 Whilst on the one hand this honours 
Schopenhauer's sentiment that ethics should be observational, I am acutely aware that my 
reasoning may fall foul of the accusation that I have gone to the extreme in my example. 
Nevertheless, I believe that given On the Basis of Morality was written in direct response to 
The Groundwork, it is fair to focus in on this work and its relationship to a polarised modern, 
academic discussion. This discussion involves the Holocaust and is further to the earlier case 
of Eichmann in chapter one. Here I consider lying to the murderer at the door, with the aim of 
evidencing that Kant’s noumenal, a priori moral law, fails in examples of complex, but 
nonetheless real a-posteriori ethical dilemmas, just as Schopenhauer suggests. The argument 
I wish to posit is twofold, firstly that examples such as the case of Le Chambon represent a 
Schopenhauerian ethic of compassion,143144 and secondly, and most controversially, that Kant’s 
categorical imperative is the antithesis in this very human scenario.  
Some have argued that the atrocities of the holocaust, the banality of evil exhibited by the 
Nazi’s and as significant - the phenomena of the ‘bystander’, indicates that the time was 
representative of a moral and ethical paralysis. Elie Wiesel famously writes, 
‘In those times there was darkness everywhere. In heaven and on earth, all the gates of 
compassion seemed to have been closed. The killer killed and the Jews died and the 
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outside world adopted an attitude either of complicity or of indifference. Only a few 
had the courage to care.’145 
Wiesel’s quote reminds us that for most, acting from ego was the dominant narrative. 
Compassion in the main was ‘closed’ to the Jew’s during the Shoah. However, Schopenhauer’s 
understanding of incentives is not about to dispute this. His argument is clear, one is primarily 
motivated by the anti-moral incentive that is ego. There exists however, according to 
Schopenhauer, one true moral incentive and that is compassion. Those ‘few (that) had the 
courage to care’ were those that participated in, were motivated by and acted on the ‘weal and 
woe’ of the Jewish other.146 Examples of these few can be found and Le Chambon is a shining 
example of this compassion in the face of suffering.147  
Conversely, when looking to the atrocities of the Holocaust, Kant’s CI becomes very 
controversial. Kant notoriously claimed that lying is never permissible (as doing so would 
require universal acceptance that lying was always and for everyone permissible).148 Following 
the CI one could, as in the case of the Le Chambon et al, harbour Jewish refugees and act in 
accordance with duty. However, if a Nazi soldier were to ask if you were, you would be morally 
obligated to tell the truth despite whatever consequences may befall both you and those you 
are seeking to protect.149 The failure in Kant’s moral philosophy to translate to real human 
experience therefore lay in his noumenal, a priori foundations, for when applied to complex 
ethical quandaries such as this, it produces what can only be understood phenomenologically 
as immoral action. Giving up a Jew to a murderous Nazi soldier simply because to lie would 
be to break a moral law is by any estimation preposterous. As such many Kantians part 
company with Kant on this very example. However, many also argue for a kind of abrogation 
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and cite later works to evidence that this particular example is something Kant resolves.150 
Nevertheless, this argument is formed from the understanding given in The Groundwork and 
is posited in contrast to the direct response of Schopenhauer's On The Basis of Morality, so I 
therefore argue it is justified. 
This return to the Holocaust may be regarded by some as an extreme attempt to evidence a 
position that Kant’s moral philosophy fails in matters of real-life ethics. However, the 
reasoning behind this, as with the example of Eichmann’s appeal to the CI, is because Kantian 
ethics and deontology moreover, is held in high regard even in its basic formulation. It is taught 
in schools and regarded with great esteem by many. Conversely, if asked, many know little of 
Schopenhauerian ethics, which is surprising given his very relatable philosophy. What using 
the example of the Holocaust does, is elucidate upon the importance of compassion in 
normative and comprehendible ethical scenarios. In so doing, it highlights the failing of the CI 
to account for the complexities of such scenarios. To borrow from Schopenhauer, ‘opposites 
illustrate each other’ so when placed in comparison one draws out the weaknesses in the 
other.151 
Michael McIntyre writes in his essay entitled "Altruism, Collective Action, and Rationality: 
The Case of Le Chambon” that the story of Le Chambon is an example ‘of moral excellence 
[in] human community restored.’152 Certainly, whilst Schopenhauer argues one typically 
functions from ego, his perspective on what constitutes moral action is exactly ‘human 
community’ – being stirred by fellow human suffering in such a way that one ‘participates’ in 
the ‘woe’ of the other and thus acts accordingly with compassion.153 As such he writes: 
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‘Boundless compassion for all living things is the firmest and surest guarantee of pure 
moral conduct, and needs no casuistry. Whoever is inspired with it will assuredly injure 
no one, will wrong no one, will encroach on no ones rights; on the contrary, he will be 
lenient and patient with everyone, will forgive everyone, will help everyone as much 
as he can, and all his actions will bear the stamp of justice, philanthropy, and loving-
kindness.’154  
To argue that Kantian ethics fails completely in this regard would be unfair. For the CI could 
be formulated, as is arguably in Kant’s example of the ‘Moral Misanthrope’, to consider other-
regarding acts of kindness. But this discussion of the Holocaust highlights again the 
contradictions in Kant’s rigid deontology. For whilst one can help a Jewish refugee (working 
from the premise that I myself may too need assistance at some other time and helping one 
another then translates to be a universal act of duty). However, I must also be willing to give 
up that refugee, and of course myself, to the Nazi’s should they ask me directly if I have shown 
compassion to, or indeed am protecting the Jewish person.155 My research therefore, though 
clearly not exhaustive, has failed to find defence of Kant’s CI in this argument. Indeed, some 
argue that in later works, specifically the Doctrine of Right, Kant discusses rightful interaction 
in the empirical world and this somehow abrogates the simplicity of his original application of 
CI to lying.156 However, despite the charge of ‘absurdity’157 in taking the CI as written directly 
in The Groundwork, I suggest that this abrogation is equally absurd. Kant notoriously claimed 
that it is never morally permissible to tell a lie.158 This is not, as Arendt claims in the case of 
Eichmann, merely misunderstanding – this is fundamental to Kantian deontology. As such 
then, I hope to have evidenced through looking at this normative ethical dilemma, that Kant’s 
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failure to recognise the need for compassion, compassion that itself may need to, in extreme 
circumstances abrogate reason, is the fundamental failure of his moral philosophy. Moreover, 
Kant’s formulation of moral philosophy can then, as shown in this example of lying, actually 
















                                                          




It must be said that my desire to bring the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer to the fore, and 
champion the role of compassion in morality has not been without reservation. The field of 
deontology and Kantianism moreover owes its popularity to Kant’s sophisticated and well-
reasoned attempt to provide a universal moral philosophy that is not only easily 
comprehensible, but also, in most cases ‘universal’ as intended.160 Compassion conversely is 
commonly understood as relative. This is a charge I do not attempt to refute. However, I hope 
to have demonstrated, using the less well-known moral philosophy of Schopenhauer, the need 
for compassion in ethics. I take great inspiration from the academics highlighted in this paper, 
Hinman, Leier, Cartwright, Janaway et al, who recognise the myopic nature of Kant’s 
deontology enough to consider Schopenhauer's alternative. As I have sought to extrapolate, 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are not without flaw. However, those flaw’s seem to me to be 
outweighed by his genuine appreciation of human phenomena.  
I close this thesis with a reflection upon the dilemma posed in Schopenhauer contra Kant, that 
is, whether appeals to universalised duties or instead the notion of metaphysical compassion 
should form the basis of what we know to be moral. I conclude that the Kantian model of moral 
law, that which denies the necessity of compassion, simply lacks motivation and is, in its 
reliance upon reason and duty alone, too myopic to account for complex human phenomena. 
Compassion however, as understood by Schopenhauer, prompts a metaphysical 
acknowledgment of the human others ‘weal and woe’ as our own, which in turn demands a 
moral response.  
 
                                                          






Allison, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem (London: Penguin, 1992) 
Atwell, John, Schopenhauer: The Human Character (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,  
1990) 
Baron, Marcia, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1995)  
Baron, Marcia, “Acting from Duty”. In: Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) 
Bergande, Wolfram, Kant's apathology of compassion. In: Louis Schreel (ed.), Pathology & 
Aesthetics. Essays on the Pathological in Kant and Contemporary Aesthetics (Germany: 
Duesseldorf University Press, 2014) pp. 11-47  
Cartwright, David., “Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers: The Metaphysics of Mitleid” 
(European Journal of Philosophy Vol.16, 2008) pp. 292–310 
Cartwright, David E., “Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity" (Journal of 
the History of Ideas, Vol. 45, 1984) pp. 83-98 
Cartwright, David., Schopenhauer: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
Cartwright, David E., “Schopenhauer on the Value of Compassion”. In: Bart Vandenabeele 
(ed.). A Companion to Schopenhauer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012) pp. 249-265 
Cartwright, David E., “Schopenhauer's Narrower Sense of Morality”. In: Janaway 1999 
pp.252–92 
Denis, Lara, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals A Critical Guide (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
DeWitt, Janelle, "Respect for the Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason." (Philosophy Vol. 
89, No.1, 2014) pp. 31-62 
Draper, Allison Stark, Pastor André Trocmé: Spiritual Leader of the French Village Le 
Chambon (The Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2000) 
Fossee, Jordan Michael, On Acting From Duty (An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis, 
2014) 




Guyer, Paul, “Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Methods of Philosophy”. In: Christopher Janaway 
(ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) pp. 93-137 
Guyer, Paul, Knowledge, reason and taste: Kant‘s response to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 
Guyer, Paul, Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion (Kantian Review, 17, no.3, 2012) pp.403-
429 
Halberstam, Joshua, From Kant to Auschwitz (Social Theory and Practice Vol. 14, No. 1, 
Spring 1988) pp. 41-54 
Hand, Seán, Facing the other: The ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (Routledge, 2014) 
Herman, Barbara, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty”. In: Barbara Herman, The 
Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) 
Hildebrand, Carl, Compassion and the Moral Law (University College, University of Oxford, 
2000) 
Hinman, Laurence M., Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (Wadsworth: Cengage 
Learning, 2013) 
Jacquette, Dale, Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Acumen, 2005) 
Janaway, Christopher, Beyond selflessness: reading Nietzsche's Genealogy (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 
Janaway, Christopher, (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood." 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) 
Leier, Brendan Terrence, Schopenhauer Redux: A Contemporary Rereading of Schopenhauer's 
Theory of Compassion (University of Alberta, 2002) 
Louden, Robert B., Kant's Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 
Magee, Bryan., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) 
McIntyre, Michael, "Altruism, Collective Action, and Rationality: The Case of Le Chambon." 
(Polity Vol. 27, No. 4, 1995) pp.537-557 
Magee, Bryan, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) 
Mannion, Gerard, Mitleid, Metaphysics and Morality Understanding Schopenhauer's Ethics 
(Schopenhauer Jahrbuch Vol. 87, 2002) pp. 87-117 




Marshall, Colin, "Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism." (Journal of the History 
of Philosophy Vol. 55, No .2, 2017) pp. 293-316 
Neill, Alex, and Christopher Janaway, eds. Better consciousness: Schopenhauer's philosophy 
of value (John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 
Reilly, Richard, Ethics of compassion: Bridging ethical theory and religious moral discourse 
(Lexington Books, 2010) 
Rittner, Carol and Myers, Sondra, The Courage to Care (NYU Press, 1986) 
Roberts-Miller, Patricia, "The tragic limits of compassionate politics" (JAC, 2007) pp. 692-700 
Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What's the right thing to do? (Macmillan, 2010) 
Silber, John, Kant's Ethics: The Good, Freedom, and the Will  
Schopenhauer, Arthur, On the basis of morality (Hackett Publishing, 1998) 
Sverdlik, Steven, Compassion and Sympathy as Moral Motivation (Occasional Papers, Vol 3, 
2008) 
Tsanoff, Radoslav A., Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics (The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 19, No. 5, September 1910) pp. 512-534 
Varden, Helga. "Kant and lying to the murderer at the door... One more time: Kant's legal 
philosophy and lies to murderers and Nazis" (JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 
41, No. 4, Winter 2010, 403–421, 2010) 
Wiesel, Elie, The Courage to Care, edited by Carol Rittner and Sondra Myers (NYU Press, 
1986) 
Wolf, Ursula, How Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion can contribute to today’s ethical 
debate (Enrahonar: quaderns de filosofia 55, 2015) pp. 0041-49 
Wood, Allen, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Young, Julian, Schopenhauer (London: Routledge, 2005) 
 
